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Two separate frameworks have existed for the analysis of social predicaments in which busi-
nesses play a role: issues management and stakeholder management. In this paper, we argue that
the chasm dividing these two literatures is artificial, and potentially obstructive to the advance-
ment of our knowledge of the position of business in contemporary societies. The position we
take in the present paper is that all social predicaments have an issues side as well as a stake-
holder side and that a dual focus on both issues and stakeholders is therefore essential to under-
standing the evolution of these predicaments and crucial to managerial dealings with these issues.
We present an integrative co‐evolutionary framework, explaining the dynamics between issues
and stakeholders in all consecutive stages of a predicament's evolution. The framework proposes
a new way of thinking about issues and stakeholders, as such facilitates a deeper understanding
of how the social environment of business is constituted, and offers new insights for the practical
management of issues and stakeholders.1 | INTRODUCTION
When key organizational decision‐makers have to navigate their firms
through the challenging and often uncharted waters of the social and
political environments in which they operate, they face two theoretical
options, with very different practical implications. The first is to iden-
tify all key organizations and groups that are influenced, directly and
indirectly, by the organization's decisions that may affect organiza-
tional outcomes. Sensible managers will recognize that these stake-
holders are sometimes parties with whom the organization already
has a well‐developed, on‐going relationship, whereas at other times,
they are parties that only have relationships with other influential
actors in the organizational network, but whom can exert indirect
influence on the organization through these relationships, and in some
situations, there are no preexisting relationships of any kind. Once
these stakeholders are identified, managers can prioritize them
according to their power over the corporation and the urgency and
legitimacy of their claims (Mitchell, Agle, &Wood, 1997). Realizing that
organizational resources and attention are always scarce, managers
can then use the outcome of this prioritization exercise to accommo-
date the needs of the most powerful and/or urgent of these stake-
holders, provided the organization has carefully identified all the key
stakeholders. Note carefully the use of the term “key stakeholders”—
searching out all of the actual and potential stakeholders, directly and
indirectly impacted, is we believe a futile exercise.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/paThe second option open to key decision‐makers is to focus not so
much on these groups per se, but rather on the social predicaments fac-
ing the organization. Regardless of whether these social predicaments
are called strategic, public, or social issues, they all have the potential
to interfere with the organization's attempts to realize its strategic
intent if they are left unattended. In the traditional issues management
process, decision‐makers first scan the organizational environment for
new predicaments emerging on the horizon. Next, they monitor these
issues throughout their life cycle, in order to interpret their nature and
to evaluate their potential consequences. Finally, they come up with
an appropriate set of responses, timed to the life cycle of the issue
and to the ability of the organization to influence the issue.
Managers will of course realize that separating these two options
is not a practical choice in real life. If they focus on their current set of
stakeholders only, there is a fair chance that they will miss out on new
threats and opportunities emanating in their environments. If they
focus on issues only, they may suffer reputational damage, as they
get known as reactive fire fighters rather than pro‐active fire pre-
venters. Yet in the business and society and strategic management lit-
erature, Chinese walls seem to separate the bodies of work on issues
management and stakeholder theory and practice, to which these
options correspond. In the present paper, we argue that this situation
is conceptually and practically undesirable, as both perspectives can
at best offer only a partial and incomplete understanding of social
predicaments.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1
2 MAHON ET AL.We view such social predicaments as controversies (economic,
political, social, or any combination) that may have a negative effect
on the ability of organizations to realize their strategic intent if left
unattended (others refer to these types of situations as “wicked prob-
lems”; see Head & Alford, 2015; McMillan & Overall, 2016). Social pre-
dicaments always have an issue side (in that they involve a
disagreement over the distribution of resources and positions) as well
as a stakeholder side (in that they affect or address a number of actors,
who will then automatically have a stake in whether and how the issue
will be resolved). Social predicaments are broader than strategic issues.
Strategic issues must of necessity be identified with something—gen-
erally an organization in order to be “strategic.” Social predicaments
exist independently of the organization and have a different ontologi-
cal status.1 We will present a co‐evolutionary framework in this paper,
pointing out how stakeholders influence issues and vice versa,
throughout the various interlinked evolutionary stages of a societal
predicament. On the one hand, stakeholders help to frame issues and
use symbols to raise the visibility of a particular set of issues in order
to build awareness and coalitions and achieve their desired solution or
preferred outcome(s) (Chong, 1996; Cobb & Elder, 1983; Edelman,
1968; Mahon, 1989; Mitnick, 2001; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994;
Schattschneider, 1960). Alternatively, issues affect a number of parties
in any of the arenas in which the issue is played out, and as such, they
“hand‐pick” certain parties that will become stakeholders, predestinat-
ing them into activism because they hurt them in their interests.
Before presenting our framework, we first briefly review the two per-
spectives on social predicaments separately. The context of the analy-
sis that follows is focused on newly emerging issues. Issues that
currently exist generally have well‐known dimensions, and the stake-
holders and positions are equally clearly drawn.2 | TWO PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL
PREDICAMENTS
The discussion as to whether social predicaments can best be under-
stood from an issues perspective or from a stakeholder perspective is
highly similar to the long‐standing debate in physics on the nature of
light.2 In 1690, Christian Huygens proposed a theory that explained
light as a wave phenomenon. In 1704, Sir Isaac Newton offered a com-
peting explanation, stating that light was composed of little particles
emitted by luminous bodies. Both theories explain certain essential
aspects of the nature of light equally well (such as reflection and
refraction), whereas there are other phenomena, which can only be
explained from a wave view (interference, diffraction, and polariza-
tion). The photoelectric effect (which was discovered by Hertz in
1887), however, can only be understood from a particle perspective.
This analogy is telling, because issues management and stakeholder
theories can be used to explain certain aspects of social predicaments
equally well. There are certain aspects of societal problems that require
an issues perspective, however, whereas other aspects need a1In some ways, social predicaments may be analogous to campaigns in the social
movement literature. They do have the potential to mature into a social move-
ment if not dealt with in a timely and proper manner.
2The authors thank our colleague Bryan Husted for suggesting this analogy.stakeholder explanation. Ergo: If we want to understand social predic-
aments in their entirety, we need a framework that can accommodate
issues and stakeholder considerations simultaneously. Or to put it in
another way, we need to deal with the what (issue) and the who (stake-
holders) simultaneously and continuously as the issue unfolds (with
competing issue definitions) and as stakeholders enter and exit the sit-
uation over time. This is the problem facing managers in dealing with
such situations—the issue (the substantive content) and the players
involved (stakeholders) need to be addressed simultaneously. We will
present an integrative framework below, but first, we discuss both
sides of the social predicaments coin (i.e., issues and stakeholders)
separately.2.1 | Issues
What is an issue (for a more in‐depth treatment of issues management,
see Mahon, 2017)? An issue can be a disagreement over facts, values,
and/or policies (Waddock &Mahon, 1991) or a disagreement over pro-
cedural or substantive matters related to the distribution of resources
or positions (Cobb and Elder, 1983). An issue can also be a controver-
sial inconsistency based on one or more expectational gaps involving
management perceptions of changing cost/benefit positions that occur
within or between views of what is and/or ought to be corporate per-
formance or stakeholder perception of corporate performance that
implies an actual/anticipated resolution that creates significant, identi-
fiable present, or future impacts on the organization (Wartick &
Mahon, 1994). The essential trichotomy of elements in an issue, (a)
what is versus what is (factual disagreements), (b) what is versus what
ought to be (a clash of facts and values), and (c) what ought to be ver-
sus what ought to be (a clear clash of values), is crucial. Just exactly
what is the basis of the disagreement or inconsistency, and what posi-
tion (fact, value, or policy) is crucial for a variety of reasons.
One impact of this trichotomy is that it is useful in identifying the
basis for initial stakeholder involvement, and such identification allows
for assessments of the arguments, approaches, and likely initial posi-
tioning of stakeholders on the issue. That is, some stakeholders will
become involved for ideological reasons (perhaps based on value posi-
tions or on previous history with the issue and others involved in its
resolution), while others will become engaged because of fact‐based
concerns, yet others may become involved because of concerns with
the process of resolution. Clearly, the driving reason for involvement
being held by each stakeholder is important to both the formulation
of strategy and tactics and the formation of alliances on an issue. In
addition, this incentive for involvement may be helpful in assessing
the power, urgency, and legitimacy of a given stakeholder. In other
words, how issues evolve is primarily a function of three factors, nota-
bly: (a) which stakeholders become involved in an issue (differences in
influence—which reflect the basis of their initial involvement; ideology
vs. fact‐based concerns), (b) the timing of their involvement (receding
zone of discretion), and (c) the outcome that they prefer (preferences
shape actions and hence the evolution of the issue). Figure 1 is a broad
new look at how issues evolve.
Our basic presumption is that all issues start in some primordial
state. While in this state, chance reigns supreme, and utter confusion
is the order of things. What this means to suggest is that there are
FIGURE 1 Broad type of issues
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ation by organizations and stakeholders. Hence, the process by which
“issues” emerge is critically important (and may in fact differ substan-
tially by geographic location, culture mores, political systems, and the
like), because many issues never make it past their infancy stage. This
is particularly challenging as we consider how social media and the
Internet has changed the velocity of issue emergence globally. We
offer the following definitions for your consideration:
• Amorphistic issues: an issue without definite character or nature,
lacking in organization and unity, and having no real or apparent
form, literally the absolute “raw” state of issues. It may exist simply
as awareness that “something” is not right, but it has no specificity;
for example, the public transit service is just not “right.”
• Shaped (or shaping) issues: an issue with visible makeup character-
istics of a particular item or kind of item; the condition in which
someone or something exists at a particular time (both real and
substantively and/or perceived and symbolically). The issue is
assuming shape; potentially, many stakeholders are defining it,
and responsibility for action is diffused as is the appropriate arena
for resolution. An example was the set of problems facing Hewlett
Packard over the alleged illegal investigations of leaks of confiden-
tial information from the Board of Directors that was approved by
the CEO. The issue is assuming a shape—but is it an issue of illegal
activity? Of a CEO overstepping the bounds of proper behavior?
Of an external investigator going too far? Of poor and improper
communications? Of vagueness in the law itself? Of poor corpo-
rate governance?
• Definitive issues: An issue, which has “escaped the swamp,” has
achieved visibility and definition to more than one stakeholder
and has clear (but can be broad) identity and for which it is possible
for individual stakeholders or groups of stakeholders to build
momentum on. As we will note below, definitive issues can regressif issue momentum is lost; for example, disinterest over time with
the issue, the issue is replaced by more pressing issues, or no single
(or narrow set) of definitions gain traction, or the issue goes
through a process of splintering. Genetically modified organisms
are one such issue—it is defined by those in Europe and elsewhere
as a public health and safety issue. In the United States, it is being
defined as a trade issue, and both issue definitions are being
played out across the world with different stakeholder involve-
ments and likely different organizational impacts.
By issue definition, we mean a statement of the meaning of a
word, word group, or a sign or symbol. The action or the power of
describing, explaining, or making definite and clear sharp demarcation
of outlines or limits is part of this defining process. Definitive issues
have threshold levels of clarity (either real, symbolic, or both) that are
significant enough to allow for stakeholder involvement and engage-
ment in debate/discussion in larger public forums and for the forma-
tion of coalitions and alliances among and across stakeholders.
Definitive issues tend to be time bound (of limited existence or capable
of maintaining broad public interest for limited periods) and seek an
arena for resolution. It is between amorphistic and shaped issues that
an organization or stakeholder can impact the emergence of an issue
(for example, driving an issue to a particular arena for resolution, driv-
ing an issue to be merged with another existing issue, or supplanting
that existing issue). It is between shaped and definitive issues that
the process of issue engagement (encounters with stakeholders) truly
unfolds. Any given issue can bounce back and forth between
amorphism and shaping in the pre and emergent stage and bounce
back and forth between shaping and definitive issues. The “bouncing”
is often driven by specific strategies and tactics of organizations and
stakeholders, or by events external to the specific issue at hand.
Figure 2 (to be introduced later in this analysis) is a follow‐up to
Figure 1—it presumes that an issue has emerged from the swamp
FIGURE 2 An integrative framework
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action in the “swamp”; that is, actions are visible to others and can
engender reactions. It is important here to recall the observations of
Schattschneider (1960). He noted that in any public contest, the “win-
ner” is determined by whose side the audience supports (Cobb & Elder,
1983; Mahon, 1989; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). It is the attraction (and
in some cases the perceived attraction is enough to compel action) of
the general public—or key stakeholders to one's position that leads
to success—but this attraction and building of momentum can only
be undertaken if two conditions are met. First, the issue has to be what
we have termed definitive. How can we determine stakeholder inter-
est (much less position and strategy) without a clear issue, or at a min-
imum a small number of competing definitions? Second, the issue has
to be “visible” to more than one stakeholder (otherwise how can stake-
holders get involved?). This naturally raises the question of where
(strategically/tactically/positionally) and when a stakeholder should
engage in the issue. In order to better understand this, we need to have
a deeper understanding of what stakeholders are and how they
become involved in an issue.3Indeed, we would argue for the existence of “process” stakeholders that are dif-
ferent in orientation and involvement than either issue or corporate‐based
stakeholders. These “process‐based” stakeholders are concerned with fairness,
access, and equitability issues around a process of resolution. They are not inter-
ested in any specific outcome per se, but in the fairness of the process that is
used to deal with and resolve the issue.2.2 | Stakeholders
What is a stakeholder? The Stanford Research Institute is usually
credited for coining the actual term in 1963, but it has been Freeman
who has popularized the phrase with his oft‐cited 1984 book Strategic
Management: A Stakeholder Approach. The main title of this important
book—Strategic Management—is interesting for at least two reasons.
First, the book clearly formulates an instrumental (in contrast to nor-
mative) stakeholder theory. Freeman emphasizes that organizations
should develop stakeholder management capabilities in order to
ensure that they can obtain their most preferred outcomes in the soci-
etal arena. In this view, the sole criterion for granting a party stake-
holder status is prudence, not some deeper underlying ethical
principle. With this modern history of stakeholder management in
mind, it remains a remarkable fact that stakeholder theory has been
embraced (some would say hijacked) by business ethics scholars after
1984 to such an extent that it has almost become heresy to point
out that companies can and must adopt stakeholder strategies for
instrumental reasons. With respect to the question of stakeholderdefinition, a second implication of the title of Freeman's (1984) work
is more important. The discipline of strategic management is exclu-
sively focused on key decision‐makers in organizations and aims at
explaining how they can make their organizations rise above competi-
tive parity (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991). Hence, a book that looks
at stakeholder issues through a strategic management lens is
guaranteed to focus exclusively on corporate stakeholders. We do
not argue that corporate stakeholders are not an important category
of stakeholders, but it would certainly be imprudent to stop our analy-
sis here. If we adopt a public affairs or issues management perspective,
it becomes clear that not only corporations but also issues too can
have stakeholders. Parties can feel that they are or are going to be
affected by a specific issue, even if they are still in limbo with respect
to who is to blame for the situation. Hence, in addition to recognizing
corporate stakeholders, it is also important to note that there are issue
stakeholders, who define their identity as a stakeholder more in
respect to the issues facing them than to the companies or other actors
involved with those issues.3 These issue stakeholders profile their
identities around certain issues that either affect them or that they
have chosen to focus on. For example, the “Greens” tend to focus their
efforts and become involved in those issues that deal with the environ-
ment, and animal rights groups (e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals) tend to focus on issues of import to animals. It does not
matter to them “who” the foe is—corporation, government, and the
general public—it is the issue that drives actions. Nonetheless, such
issue‐oriented stakeholders can engage in contests with corporations
—as corporations can become the focal player around which the issue
itself revolves. Often, corporations underestimate the ideological fever
and passion with which these issue‐oriented stakeholders act or fail to
consider them at all. Issue‐based stakeholders have great capacity to
surprise other players in an issues contest.
More importantly even, we believe that stakeholders can switch
between being a corporate stakeholder and an issue stakeholder, and
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issue stakeholder, parties are often better described as budding stake-
holders—parties who are only slowly beginning to realize the magni-
tude of certain societal predicaments and who are not yet certain
about what stake it is they are holding, nor in what or whom. It is
important to realize that many societal predicaments represent what
Mason and Mitroff (1980) have called “wicked problems” (again see
Head & Alford, 2015; McMillan & Overall, 2016)—problems that are
too complex to be understood by any specific actor alone, that have
multiple causes, and that cannot be solved in a piecemeal fashion.
Yet in today's world, even though complexity is growing, so is aware-
ness of issues and the ability to communicate across time and distance
in an instant. What this means for our stakeholder is that as an issue
emerges from the swamp; a stakeholder will not be able to process
all the issue‐relevant information that “hits” them immediately and cor-
rectly (a bounded rationality approach). As such, our “budding” stake-
holders are faced with three problems: (a) those related to the
complexity of the issue, (b) those related to the inherent information
processing capabilities of any individual stakeholder, and (c) those
related to the speed with which an issue can be advanced.
This wicked problem character has important consequences for
how specific parties switch stakeholder status over time. Due to the
complexity of social predicaments, stakeholders usually start out as
budding stakeholders. Usually, they only realize that they are a stake-
holder of something or someone because they are confronted with
the symptoms of a situation that is undesirable to them or has the
potential to be undesirable to them. Stakeholders may experience an
unexpected degradation of their quality of life, a deterioration of their
environment, or a sudden drop in the degree of satisfaction their cus-
tomers express with the quality of their products and services and
others. Note how the information‐processing capability of the stake-
holder impacts on their ability to sense an issue and when it is impacting
on them. This time lag between receipt of information and sensing of
relevance, pressure, and action is a critical time period for all stake-
holders. At this time, budding stakeholders are struggling to make
sense of the changing conditions in their environment, and the main
question they seek an answer too is what is going on here? This is a
dangerous time for stakeholders as other actors may enter into the
contest faster than they do—and change the issue and the forum
where it is being discussed and press for resolution before all stake-
holders have processed what is going on. Time is not an ally in issue
contests, and the advantage oft goes to those stakeholders who can
move quickly and decisively.
Once a stakeholder group gets a firmer grip on what the dimen-
sions of a specific problem are, it usually becomes a stakeholder of a
specific issue. The stakeholder transforms from a budding stakeholder
into an issue stakeholder. The stakeholder realizes that a social predic-
ament is unfolding, to which there are many potential solutions, allies,
competitors, and neutral parties. The stakeholder will also realize that
there are certain parties in its environment with whom it shares a pref-
erence for a certain outcome, and the issue stakeholder may decide to
establish coalitions with such like‐minded parties in its environment in
order to increase its chances of obtaining a desired solution for the
predicament. Only when the stakeholder has made an inventory of
which actors share its perception with respect to what desirableoutcomes might be and of which actors have a different solution in
mind is it in a position to transform itself into a corporate stake-
holder—a party that seeks to influence the corporations (or the arena
in which a solution is likely to be sought) in its environment that it per-
ceives to stand in the way of itself reaching the most preferred solu-
tion. It can then alone or in combination with other stakeholders
attempt to influence the corporation or an arena in which it has a
stake—either by persuasion, cooperation, or coercion—to stop pursu-
ing the solution that is unfavorable to the stakeholder.
Of course, the path from budding through issue to corporate
stakeholder is not smooth, often crooked and full of digressions. Stake-
holders may switch between issue and corporate status. One reason is
that an initial choice for a specific target organization may have been
incorrect. The organizations may not oppose the most desired solution
of the organization after all or may not be an actor that has much say in
the further evolution of the issue. Another reason is that the (environ-
mental) conditions may have changed because the stakeholder com-
mitted himself or herself to the organization: The issue may have
become defined differently, making other actors more salient in the
process; the organization may have become co‐opted and now share
the stakeholder's most preferred solution; or the organization may
have ceased to be a factor of any importance in the issue for any other
reason. In addition, the potential resolution of the issue may emerge in
an arena in which certain stakeholders have no standing or influence.
In all of these cases, stakeholders may decide to stop being corporate
stakeholders and regress to being issue stakeholders. Once they then
decide who their new target is going to be, they may become corpo-
rate stakeholders again. We cannot underestimate this process of
shifting back and forth from issue to corporate stakeholder, and such
shifts can occur over a long period of time. This shift has enormous
implications for the organization attempting to deal with stakeholders
as it drives at the heart of their involvement and may explain what
appears to the corporation to be an inconsistent behavior by an exter-
nal stakeholder. However, it is possible for certain stakeholders to
remain issue stakeholders ad infinitum. Reasons for this positioning
might be explained by resource and/or focus constraints, history as a
champion on certain issues, prior relationships with corporations that
prevent legitimate establishment as a corporate stakeholder, and
stakeholder strategies that seek to maintain the issue as an open one
until such time as they see an opportunity to “win” on the issue. Simi-
larly, some stakeholders will skip the issue stage altogether and
become corporate stakeholders immediately. Reasons for this might
include prior interactions with the corporation or an ideological bias
toward certain industries or firms as the source of the problem. Com-
plicating this problem, as noted earlier, is the shifting geographic orig-
ination of issues and stakeholder alignments (see Lucea & Doh, 2012).
There are, of course, other approaches to consideration of stake-
holders that have been advanced recently, but they do not consider
in any detail the issues‐stakeholder management challenge. Griffin
(2016), for example, has looked at stakeholders from the perspective
of co‐creating value (see also Stout, 2012 for additional support for
looking at value). Lankoski, Smith, and Van Wasserhove (2016) come
at the assessment of value from the stakeholder and not the corporate
perspective. In any event, the assessment of stakeholder value sur-
rounding corporate behavior and/or issues is a difficult one to make.
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ership perspective (see Waligo, Clarke, & Hawkins, 2014; Weiss,
2014). Mahon and Wartick (2012) have looked at how corporations
seem to profile stakeholders and alter corporate actions over time to
prioritize different stakeholders, and Helmig, Spraul, and Ingenhoff
(2016) have looked at how stakeholder pressure can impact implemen-
tation of corporate social responsibility programs.4Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat (1980–1981) first suggested the distinction between
and among naming, blaming, and claiming.3 | TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE
FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL PREDICAMENTS
Previously, we introduced two remarkably similar evolutionary pro-
cesses. The first described the development of amorphistic through
shaping to definitive issues, whereas the second described the
sequence through which stakeholders evolve from budding through
issue to corporate stakeholders. There is a reason for this similarity,
and the reason is that both represent different sides of what in larger
terms we have called a social predicament. Social predicaments always
have an issue “or what” side (two or more different perspectives on
what a desired outcome for the predicament would be) and an actor
“or who” side (the initiators of the predicament and the affected
parties). Obviously, social predicaments are not stable over time, but
they change in terms of form and substance. We will describe three
phases in the evolution of a social predicament: naming, blaming, and
claiming. Because all three of these phases have an issue as well as
an actor side, it is best to look at the evolution of social predicaments
as a co‐evolutionary process, in which stakeholders influence the pro-
gression of issues through their life cycle and vice versa.
According to Lewin and Volberda (1999: 527–528), co‐evolution-
ary frameworks have the following properties: (a) They are longitudinal
(in the sense that they study social systems over time); (b) they are con-
textual (they look at how phenomena or actors are embedded in their
larger social context); (c) they consider multidirectional causalities (with
actors or systems exerting reciprocal influences on one another, rather
than just unidirectional influences); (d) they incorporate mutual, simul-
taneous, lagged, and nested effects; (e) they allow for path dependence;
(f) they incorporate changes occurring at the level of different institu-
tional systems; and (g) they accommodate economic, social, and political
macro variables.
Even though this list of criteria is rather restrictive (and we think
meeting all of the criteria in actual practice is unlikely), we believe that
the framework we propose may appropriately be called co‐evolution-
ary because it is at least longitudinal in the sense that it tracks the evo-
lution of social predicaments over time. It is contextual in that it looks
at stakeholders as actors that are embedded in multiple (political,
social, and economical) arenas simultaneously, rather than that it
focuses on their relationship with a focal firm alone. It allows for
multi‐directional causality in that it acknowledges that stakeholders
shape issues, whereas issues determine which stakeholders are
involved and suggest, following Preston and Post (1975), that the
interactions themselves shape the issue, the stakeholder, and the very
processes of interaction (what they have termed “interpenetrating sys-
tems”). It incorporates lagged effects because it incorporates feedback
loops, allowing stakeholders and issues to regress to previous stagesin their evolution. Finally, it is also path dependent in that it predicts
an evolutionary trajectory or developmental process for both issues
and stakeholders, incorporating multiple stages, which cannot be
skipped or passed at will. Figure 2 introduces a co‐evolutionary frame-
work, which integrates the issue and stakeholder perspectives.3.1 | Phase 1: naming
4Naming allows for positions to be formed around an issue, for stake-
holders to get involved (and assess saliency, urgency, and power), for
coalitions and alliances of interested parties to form, and for an agenda
to be developed and an arena for the resolution of the issue. Consider
the Enron debacle—is it an issue of corporate greed/misconduct, a fail-
ure of the SEC to provide proper regulatory oversight, a failure of one
accounting firm, or a failure of the entire accounting profession? It
should be clear that the naming of an issue provides a great deal of
insight into which stakeholders are likely to become engaged, whether
the issue is to be centered on facts/values/policy, and in which arena
the issue is likely to be resolved. In some cases, a public issues cham-
pions, like Ralph Nader, Rachael Carson, Dr. Martin Luther King, Rev.
Jesse Jackson, or the Greens, can lead in naming an issue or problem.
Once the issue or problem is named, blaming can occur. This suggests
the following propositions:
Proposition 1. In the naming phase of a societal predicament, amorphistic
issues begin to take shape when it becomes clear which parties it affects;
previously disinterested parties transform into budding stakeholders when
they are confronted with the symptoms of an emerging amorphistic issue.
Proposition 2a. Amorphistic issues evolve into shaping issues when
cause–effect relationships are becoming more evident (due to new facts
becoming available and stakeholder information processing), which makes
it possible to start addressing the parties that played a role in the initiation
of the issue. Issue champions and external events can have impact here—
especially on the speed with which an issue moves to resolution.
Proposition 2b. Budding stakeholder transforms into issue stakeholders
once an issue has gained some initial shape and boundaries. An issue
stakeholder is a party that realizes that it is affected by an issue and that
is now “mapping the terrain”—looking for supporters (with whom it shares
an outcome preference) and culprits (whom have a preference for a differ-
ent outcome). In this stage, stakeholders are in a search for allies to share
the costs, efforts, and risks in dealing with the issue and to assess the
likelihood of “winning” on this issue at this time, with this constellation
of stakeholders, and in the likely arena of resolution.3.2 | Phase 2: blaming
Blaming involves the identification of a culprit (individual, organiza-
tion, process, government, and others) to hold responsible for the
problem/issue. The critical component of blaming is not that it assigns
MAHON ET AL. 7responsibility but that it suggests a plan for the resolution of a prob-
lem, potential alliances to deal with the resolution of the issue, and a
specific arena for resolution (legislative, regulatory, judicial, and others
—see Mahon & McGowan, 1996 for a more in‐depth discussion of
the arena concept) and points, in a general way to a culprit or set
of culprits. We have been witnesses to the spectacle of Ford and
Firestone battling over who was to blame for the car accidents that
occurred using both of their products. This was not a simple exercise
in rhetoric. Both firms knew that the assignment of blame would
bring significant pressure on the firm and assigned the blame with
the associated impact on image and costs. If, on the other hand,
blame could be assigned to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Agency for regulatory failures, both firms might be able to escape
with little damage (either to image or to costs). The national hearings
in the United States on the September 11 tragedy are a clear exercise
in blaming—determining “who” or what agency of government con-
tributed to the unfolding sequence of events. After blaming is settled,
claiming can occur.
Proposition 3. In the blaming phase of a societal predicament, an issue
takes on a more narrowly focused initial shape; this shape may be seen
as an initial proposal for redistribution of resources and positions, thereby
affecting the stakeholders involved (as some of them will stand to gain and
others to lose). These stakeholders in turn affect the shape of the issue, as
they look for supporters and culprits to change the initial solution or shape
in their favor. In addition, stakeholders search for playing fields (or arenas)
in which the issue might ultimately be resolved/addressed.
Proposition 4a. A shaping issue transforms into a definitive issue when a
definition (or multiple definitions) has been reached to which a group (or
groups) of stakeholders agree. This definition involves a more or less defin-
itive choice for an arena in which the issue will be resolved, an identifica-
tion of the issue's culprits, and one or several avenues for solution. The
focus now is on competing definitions of the issue, and the battle is
between stakeholder networks and alliances for issue definition suprem-
acy, or for arena resolution specification.
Proposition 4b. An issue stakeholder transforms into a corporate stake-
holder once a stakeholder decides (a) which party to target (the main
obstacle standing in the way of the stakeholder's most preferred solution)
and (b) what changes to demand from that party.5Note that for ideologically drive stakeholders, they will not admit defeat, will
not withdraw, and will not regress. Their commitment to the cause is all consum-
ing—and as such, this is a special case.3.3 | Phase 3: claiming
Claiming is where specific demands are made upon someone (usually
the blamed organization) to deal with the problem or issue. For exam-
ple, in order to obtain funding for AIDS, supporters had to overcome
two hurdles. They had to convince all interested stakeholders that
the disease was brand new and that existing treatment modalities
would not work. Next, they had to convince all stakeholders that sig-
nificant new funds for research and treatment would be required
(see Cobb and Ross, 1997, Chapter 2). Not that claiming is not a guar-
antee that funds will be provided or that the issue will actually be
resolved.Proposition 5. In the claiming phase of a societal predicament, an issue
has taken on a definitive shape, which—almost dramaturgically—assigns
stakeholders their specific roles; the corporate stakeholders that are
involved with the issue now know exactly which parties to address and
what to ask for, in the context of a specific arena for resolution.3.4 | Regress to previous stages
Any given issue can bounce back and forth between amorphism and
shaping in the pre and emergent stage and bounce back and forth
betweenshapingandfully formed.The “bouncing” isoftendrivenbyspe-
cificstrategiesandtacticsoforganizationsandstakeholders,orbyevents
external to the specific predicament at hand. Similarly, any given stake-
holder can bounce back and forth between the budding stakeholder
stage and the issues stakeholder stage and bounce back and forth
betweenthe issuestageandthecorporatestage.This “bouncing” is often
driven by specific changes in the definition of the issue, by clever strate-
gies and tactics that play significant stakeholders (or stakeholder groups)
off against one another, by successful blurring and fragmentation of the
issue, or by events external to the specific predicament at hand.
Proposition 6a. Definitive issues can regress toward shaping issues as
stakeholders question or as new facts challenge the present definition of
the issue (note: here, there is something wrong with the proposed solution).
Proposition 6b. Shaping issues can regress toward amorphistic issues as
the initial solution as once established cause–effect relationships are
proven wrong (note: here, there is something wrong with the problem def-
inition). For example, before Nader started addressing the safety of cars as
“the issue,” automotive manufacturers in the United Sates were
attempting to frame the issue as one of “driver qualifications.”
Proposition 7a. Corporate stakeholders can regress toward issue stake-
holders once. They realize that the corporation they targeted is not the
most appropriate culprit (note: here, something went wrong with respect
to targeting the most appropriate culprit).
Proposition 7b. Issue stakeholders can regress toward budding stake-
holders once their beliefs concerning the impact or shape of a social pre-
dicament are disproved (note: here, there is something wrong with
perceiving or interpreting of the symptoms of a societal predicament).54 | CONCLUSION
The development of issues and problems is a complicated process.
Leaping to stakeholder management concerns and tactics without clar-
ity on the issue seems to us to be fraught with problems. At every turn
in the development of an issue, actors with stakes and interests can
come and go, and every stakeholder can take a shot at naming the
8 MAHON ET AL.problem. Even those issues, which we have called definitive, can be
obscured, narrowed, widened, or eliminated from visibility and public
interest by a clever stakeholder action.
Recognizing that issues do go through is clear, and at times, dis-
crete stages are the first step in developing responsible and effective
stakeholder response and management strategies. What becomes con-
fusing is that the process is not necessarily linear—and may be circular.
A stakeholder may believe an issue has been “handled” when it has
regressed to a previous stage and can emerge again in another guise
with different configurations of stakeholder involvement. An aware-
ness of the stages of issue development affords all stakeholders the
opportunity to deal with the problem at initial stages with a limited
number of other stakeholders involved and with limited public expo-
sure and visibility. As the issue becomes more visible, so do the num-
ber of potential stakeholders involved. As the issue unfolds, the
probability that it will expand and capture media attention and other
stakeholders increases dramatically. This places a clear premium on
the environmental scanning and sensing of the stakeholder and its abil-
ity to move quickly on an issue. It is equally important to recognize the
difference between budding, issue, and corporate stakeholders and
that the issue affects stakeholders and vice versa. This is often lost
or obscured in analyses of stakeholders and issues.
Simply put, it is time to recognize that stakeholder strategies are
meaningless without a simultaneous and continuous consideration of
the issue(s) involved. In terms of long‐range planning and positioning,
issues management properly conducted can serve as a planning tool
for stakeholder involvement and management and for better‐focused
organizational action to deal with issues as they unfold and with the
portfolio of issues that all organizations deal with over time.
We have moved ahead in stakeholder management, proposing
models and approaches for assessing stakeholders and their power,
influence, urgency, and other characteristics—all of which is an impor-
tant and a valuable research. But we have ignored the process by
which stakeholders become involved because we have neglected to
keep a research eye on the process by which issues unfold. No senior
executive of any organization would engage in actions and tactics
without a clear understanding of the strategy of the organization.
We would respectfully suggest that no organization or individual
should engage in stakeholder management without the following:
• understanding the nuances of issues (and stages thereto) and how
these can be impacted/altered/denied/changed;
• understanding why stakeholders choose to become involved with
some issues and not with others, and the basis for their
involvement;
• understanding the subtle differences between issues, process, and
corporation‐focused stakeholders and what each needs for issue
resolution;
• understanding how a “given emerging issue” interacts with existing
issues and positions and strategies and stakeholders and as part of
organizational history; and
• understanding how history between and among stakeholders
impacts on alliances and networks with regard to both specific
issues and stakeholders.Stakeholder management and issues management are inextricably
intertwined. We need more research that recognizes this fact and that
can move us to deeper levels of understanding—both theoretically and
practically.
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